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THE VANITY OF GOD
Charles Taliaferro
Christian theism gives rise to what may be termed the problem of Divine vanity. The God of
Christianity seems to be vain with respect to matters of creation, worship, and redemption.
God's creating beings in His own image is akin to an artist creating self-portraits. The
Divine command (or invitation) that these image-bearers worship Him seems to be the
height of egotism. In matters of redemption, God still insists upon being in the limelight,
the talk of the town. This prima donna God does not seem very self-effacing. In "The
Vanity of God" I articulate and reply to the charge that God is vain.

An objection to theism which has received scant attention in the literature may be
called the problem of divine vanity. It may be argued that Christian theism exults
in a view of God as vain, egoistic, pompous. The problem of vanity arises in three
general (broad) areas, creation, worship, and redemption. With respect to creation, God's bringing into existence creatures in His likeness is akin to bringing
into being self-portraits, which is hardly a humble undertaking. God appears to
be a super Narcissus who delights in His own retlection. Worship seems inescapably egoistic. God has not only created images of Himself, but expects these
images to worship Him, to recount many of His greatest deeds, to be abased
before the Divine glory and adore Him. We are even commanded to worship none
other than God. Similarly, in salvation history God insists upon being at the center stage. Creature1y moral failure is offensive to the Creator. But instead of creatures succeeding in effecting reconciliation, God Himself does so. God may have
taken on human tlesh to bring about redemption, but it is still God qua divine and
human ego who is the principal saving agent. God wants to be the talk of the town.
The problem of vanity may be considered a part of the general problem of evil
as well as a problem for Christian ethics generally. It is part of the problem of evil
in that it appears to attribute to God what Christians take to be a vice. Christians
imagine God to be completely good, morally perfect and supreme, whereas the
charge of the vanity objection is that He is morally inferior to His saints. This creates a problem for a Christian ethic charging us to be perfect even as our heavenly
Father is perfect. If we follow our Maker's example, we find ourselves condemned
by the Christian understanding of God's ordinances. God appears to tlaunt preeminently the very vice God is said to abhor. I begin with preliminary retlections
on the relationship between pride and humility and then address the problem of
vanity under the headings creation, worship and redemption.
FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 6 No.2 April 1989
All rights reserved.

140

141

THE VANITY OF GOD
Pride and Humility

Vanity is a fonn of pride. Christian ethical tradition is united in its condemnation
of vanity, but it has not always condemned pride qua self-respect or proportionate
self-regard. Common parlance appears to support a distinction between acceptable
and unacceptable pride; it even reflects a quite positive approval of natural pride.
Thus, in the use of the expression "false pride," there is some suggestion that
real, true pride is appropriate. "False pride" is this proportionate pride in appearance only, in the same fashion as "false humility" and "false friends" are humility
and friends only in appearance. When someone has false pride they have passed
beyond proportionate self regard or respect and landed themselves in egocentrism,
vanity, self-aggrandizement. Even so, ordinary language is ambivalent on the
matter and "pride" simpliciter may stand for either proportionate or disproportionate self-regard, a term of approval or condemnation. Ethicists have identified
the fonner as natural or proper pride. An Aristotelian account of natural pride
is that it consists in feeling a proportionate amount of pleasure in one's undertakings, character or relationships. Vanity involves excessive, disproportionate
delight as when one takes enonnous pleasure in one's appearance, a pleasure
which eclipses any appreciation of others, and so on.
Something like the Aristotelian account seems satisfactory, though it may be
objected that vain pride or proper pride can be constituted principally by one's
beliefs and not involve any feeling of pleasure and pain. Thus, a vain person
may be one who tends to believe the very best of herself and the very worst of
another. The Aristotelian account is not thereby utterly vitiated, however, for it
seems to be essential to pride that the prideful person takes some pleasure in,
or has a positive attitude toward, the object of pride. At the very least, it would
be puzzling for Miriam to be prideful about X, unless she took X to be something
worthy of positive regard or some pleasure. In this paper I assume an Aristotelian
account of pride; pride involves some positive regard or attitude, whether or not
this also involves sensory pleasure.
Vain pride does not appear to be solely a matter of havingfa/se beliefs about
oneself. One may give great credit to oneself which is undeserved and not thereby
be prideful, for one's exalted self-estimation may be grounded upon weighty
evidence. Imagine Miriam has been told by otherwise reliable authorities she is
the best pianist in the world. Reluctantly she believes this, but she is reticent to
infonn others, blushes when she thinks of her greatness and the like. In fact,
she is a horrific piano player and the authorities are amusing themselves by
inculcating false beliefs in innocent pianists. Miriam has self-aggrandized beliefs,
but she is not vain. Vain pride appears to involve a willful self-exaltation, a
self-promotion that is unwarranted. To put the matter in epistemic tenns, we
expect a humble person to employ Cliffordian standards with regard to herself
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and William James-type, charitable standards to others.' Thus, if Miriam is
humble we might expect her to believe the best of another in a case where the
evidence if far from overwhelming and be reluctant to believe the best of herself
without some more justification. Surely a humble person need not have Cartesian
skepticism about all her positive features. Such pyrrhonism may amount to
servility. Be that as it may, we typically expect the healthy, humble person to
have a modest degree of self doubt. I do not take such self doubt to be a defining
feature of humility. I note simply that its absence is common among those in
the grip of vain pride and its presence is common among the humble.
Vain pride and natural pride may range over many areas. One may take pride
in one's scope of power, some characteristic or undergoing or even some relationship which is believed to be positive. Likewise one may have humility with
respect to some relationship, characteristic, quality, degree of power or undergoing which is believed to be positive. A marked difference between the prideful
and humble is that the humble person is aware of the limited nature of these
features. As it happens, two people may have identical features, both having
the same degree of intellectual prowess say, and yet one has pride in the degree
attained whereas the other is humble in appreciating the modesty of that degree
rshe recognizes the comparative paltry value of such intellectual achievement
over against the witness of saints]. In this example we can see the close proximity
of humility and proper pride. It may even be that a steadfast refusal to feel proper
pride could stem from a misunderstanding of humility. A humble person may
be one who knows (or has justified beliefs) that she has qualities of a certain
sort and no better, but she does not thereby deny that she has the limited qualities
she enjoys.
Two further aspects of pride and humility may be noted before treating the
objection from vanity. First, while pride seems to be incompatible with feeling
sorrow or pain in the feature one is proud about, humility is compatible with
feeling such sorrow. If we are proud of getting a grant, it cannot be that we take
sorrow or feel unmitigated pain and dismay over the windfall. However, if we
feel humility about our moral character, having a vivid sense of past and future
failings, it is possible to feel unmitigated pain and dismay over these failings.
Humility need not involve pain and sorrow in this sense, but it is compatible
with it. Second, pride, whether natural or unnatural, appears to involve some
kind of self-regard or self reflection in an essential way. To be proud that X
occurs must involve some belief or attitude relating oneself to X. I cannot be
proud of the moon unless I have some belief or attitude tying myself and the
moon together, however attenuated the tie. 2 Thus, I may be proud that my God
made it or that it is part of my universe. Humility may involve self-reference,
indeed a poignant, sharp self-awareness. But it might also be that the humble
person is very unself-conscious. One who is humble may have 'died to self' and
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have a marked self disregard or self-forgetfulness of the kind some of us have
only rarely as when we 'lose ourselves in a book' and the like.
Initially it is difficult indeed to imagine that the God of Christianity could be
humble. God is conceived of as limitless in power and knowledge, the principal
Creator of all, morally perfect, and unsurpassable in all perfection. Surely it is
hard to be humble if you are God, and still harder to imagine the God of
Christendom is humble when one considers the specific teachings examined
below of creation, worship and redemption. Recall the refrain of a popular
country song: "it's hard to be humble, when you're perfect in every way." We
reproach each other with the accusation that so-and-so acts with a "holier than
thou" attitude or "she thinks she is God." But what of the moral fiber of a being
who actually is holier than ourselves?
I dismiss two ways of avoiding these questions at the outset. One is to claim
that God could not be vain because God is not a being. 3 There is an important
theistic metaphysics identifying God as Being itself. If this metaphysical scheme
is correct and only beings can be egotistic and vain, it follows God cannot be
vain. This will not settle the vanity objection for me, however, as I do not accept
such a reading of theism. Even if the vanity objection were put to rest in such
a fashion other problems would then arise about our attributing a range of features
to God theists have been wont to do, e.g., loving, compassionate, just, and the
like. The Being tradition endeavors to apply such terms to God in an analogical
sense, but if these terms may be analogically applied, so might vanity. In any
event, I elect to face the vanity objection from the standpoint of identifying God
as a being, not Being. This allows the vanity objection to be advanced in a
strong form and presumably a defender of the alternative God-as-being
metaphysics can draw upon the results, if successful, in arguing it is inappropriate
to attribute vanity to God, in both a univocal as well as analogical sense of 'vanity.'
I also will not appeal to a second way to undercut the vanity objection, namely
claiming God lacks feelings. The doctrine of divine impassibility has been taken
to deny God has feelings of pain and pleasure. If vain pride involves feeling
inordinate pleasure in one's own features, presumably a being incapable of any
feelings of pleasure at all, cannot have vain pride. I accept a version of theism
which allows that God has feelings like pleasure and pain, albeit I do not construe
these as somatic or bodily undergoings. In section III this distinction is clarified.
It may be noted, too, that even contemporary defenders of Divine impassibility
have not denied God experiences some emotion. In an important recent work,
Divine Impassibility, Richard Creel argues God experiences pleasure but not
sorrow.4
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Creation of Divine image bearers as traditionally conceived may appear to be the
height of vanity. God is pictured as creating the cosmos for his own glory and creatures are brought into being who are images or reflections of God. They are even
called to so act that they come into an increasing likeness to their Maker. Certainly
this suggests an extraordinary delight in self. The iconography of pride identifies
the mirror as one of vanity's principal instruments. Isn't the Christian God one who
loves His own reflection so much that creation is but His looking glass?
The critic may urge further that an appeal to God as Trinity does not suffice to
avoid the objection from vanity. The triune life of God might appear to be a supreme
model of other-regarding love and self-donation. The Father, Son and Holy Spirit
are continuously united in will, forever expressing loving regard for the other.
However this is spelled out, the objection of vanity can be raised in terms of the
vanity of the Trinity itself. After all, a club of three members might behave in a
chauvinistic, aggressively self-concerned manner even though each member of the
club behaves in a perfectly other-regarding fashion to his or her fellow member.
Similarly, the objection from vanity is not altered by recent discussion as to whether
creation by God is voluntary as a freely chosen act or necessary as an act which was
free only in the sense of being not forced by a third party, but otherwise was a necessary manifestation of God's nature as goodness. S All such discussion might settle is
the quandary whether Divine vanity is a freely elected vice or that God is vain by
His very nature.
I think that the objection from vanity is less forceful with respect to creation
than with respect to worship and redemption. Briefly, a reply to the critic lies
in a fuller appreciation of the nature of creation, the metaphysical distinction
between God and creatures, and what is meant by being created in God's image.
If classic Christian metaphysics is correct, then God is the only causal agent
who could be responsible for there being a contingent cosmos at all. It is a
necessary condition of the existence of any contingent object that God exercises
his creative conserving power sustaining it in existence. For God to lovingly
interact with another, He must create it. Presumably both loving another and
acting haughtily before another, requires that the other be created and conserved
by God. Bare creation and conservation of a being does not entail God is vain.
God was not in the position of excluding lots of other gods from creating, failing
to wait His tum in line. To alter slightly one of Peirce's dictums: gods are not
as plentiful as blackberries. Likewise it appears that neither God's failing to
create nor creating entail God is vain. Just as creating may well be a necessary
condition to loving, other-regarding encounter, so failing to create need not entail
God is vain, for while God as trinity may (as the critic charges) image some
ghastly mutual self-congratulatory club, it certainly need not do so. We can
imagine treating the triune Godhead as a society of love in which other-regard
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ingness reigns and, while accompanied by proper pride insofar as there is genuine
delight in the relations and features of Godhood, it is not in excess (one is hard
pressed to imagine excess here) and such self-delight is hardly a matter of harming
possible creatures. Failing to create does not entail God is vain. Nor is it the
case that God is vain because He creates.
But why create in one's own image? Not everything in the created order is
characterized as a divine image; there are rivers, mountains, volcanoes, and
rocks. Only in the biological world, and specifically among sentient, thinking,
active beings do we find any singling out of creatures who are Divine image
bearers. And it is here that we may note the marked difference between a creature
painting endless self-portraits and the Divine creating in His image. In the latter
case, God brings into existence agents, creative beings distinct from Himself.
Self-portraits do not love or hate their Maker and their fellow God-portraits. Our
self-portraits do not hate and love, nor possess emotions in any literal sense.
Creatures who are thinking, feeling agents bear a marked similarity to their
creator, but it is in precisely the ways that allow them to have a life in some
way independent of their maker. We, as image bearers, are not unlike Goethe's
description in Faust, "little gods in the world."
But consider the following objection. Imagine a mad scientist, Arthur, who
populates the world with thousands of clones. Despite the fact these clones are
able to live in measured independence of Arthur their creator (Arthur the 500th
can insult the original Arthur), isn't there something unseemly egoistic about
our mad scientist's creation? Is God's creating us in His likeness analogous to
Arthur's cloning creatures that resemble himself?
Yes and no. What appears to be unseemly in the thought experiment is that the
mad scientist's cloning amounts to his producing creatures who narrowly resemble
himself, in gender, size, race, weight and personality features. Whatever their subsequent exercise of free will, the Arthurs are homogeneous; they are modeled after
a limited, perhaps flawed, original. If we alter the thought experiment and suppose
that Arthur produces a rich variety of creatures, the ego resemblance is lessened
and there is less suggestion of egoism in his creative work. God does not have a
specific race, gender, size or weight to copy. Divine image bearers are persons,
whatever their dimensions. Moreover, it is good for there to be persons, beings
that enjoy sensation and desires and who can exercise reason, memory, imagination, and agency. Thus, it is plausible to regard the creation of such beings as
good whether it be by Arthur or God. Our resemblance to God consists in our
enjoyment of good making powers like agency, the capacity to love and the like;
powers enabling us to be co-creators with God. Prominent Christian philosophers
have identified the chief resemblance between God and Divine image bearers as
the possession of will. That which makes us in God's image is that which enables
us to have a will (and thus a life) independent of God (St. Bernard, William de
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Saint Thierry, Richard Saint-Victor, Rene Descartes, Jean-Luc-Marion). I conclude that creating other agents is not by itself vain , though it may appear vain if we
imagine the Creator has brought them into existence solely to complement and
praise Himself. Earlier I noted that one rationale for creation is to glorify God.
Insofar as God is glorified simply by there being good, created states of affairs, the
problem of vanity does not arise. But what if part of what it means to glorify God
is to praise and worship Him? Is one of the reasons for our creation the bestowing
of "metaphysical compliments" (Hobbes' phrase) to the Almighty?

Worship
If creation alone does not clinch the critic's case, Christian teaching of worship
seems to do so. Isn't it the height of Divine egoism to insist creatures worship
and praise God?
I place to the side one solution to this charge, namely the view that worship
of God is to be understood solely in terms of creaturely regarding behavior. That
is, to worship God is simply to behave as good Samaritans or in a Christ-like
fashion to others. Surely any full account of Christian worship must take this
into account, but I believe that there remains a distinct Christian teaching that
God is to be praised and adored, which is not fully reducible to good creature-tocreature ethics.
A reply to the objection of vanity may be seen by a fuller appreciation of the
nature of God's attributes and the character of worship.
There is an interesting dispute going back to Plato over whether when one
loves another, Miriam loving Eric say, Miriam is loving Eric's properties or
Eric himself. Eric may well ask Miriam whether she loves him for his wealth
or his body or his wit. Would she love him if he lost these? I will not tease out
the subtleties of this debate, the puzzles that arise if Miriam were to claim to
love Eric independent of any such properties ("Eric, I just love bare particulars,"
she might say). There are indeed serious problems with delimiting admirable
from undesirable forms of conditional and unconditional love. What I wish to
note here is that for an Anselmian theist the problem does not arise about whether
one would love God if God were to lose one of his perfections. Perhaps it would
be a defective form of fickle human love if Miriam ceased loving Eric when he
lost his money. The case of God is different, however, for His metaphysical
funds cannot be lost. Traditional Anselmian theism holds that God possesses
His properties essentially. Thus, God could not but be limitless in power, knowledge and goodness. In fact, the subtle doctrine of Divine simplicity holds that
the relationship of divine attributes is so close that a perspicuous theistic
metaphysics treats these attributes as distinct only from a creaturely standpoint.
Really, the Divine nature is simple, without any parts, and these different Divine
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features are different only in the sense that the Divine manifests itself differently
to the world, in some respects as omniscient knowledge (God's foreknowledge)
and omnipotent power (God's providence) and so on. While Eric and Miriam
may debate about whether each would love the other if there was a loss of money
and health, the Divine object of love cannot (of metaphysical necessity) lose His
richness and life.
To worship and adore God involves, in part, delighting in what we take to
be the Divine properties. To love God is not to love some guy who happens to
be very wise, but it is to love, adore and delight in supreme Wisdom, Goodness,
Knowledge and Power. The question does not arise whether we would still
worship God if God were to lose Goodness, Wisdom, Knowledge and Power.
A being that could lose these in toto would simply not be God. Thus, one
important point here is that worship is not directed primarily at an ego (or three
egos) but at the instantiation to a supreme degree of various perfections. We do
not love a Divine bare particular. Compare the dictum about creatures: we should
love the sinner and hate the sin. Whatever may be thought about loving sinners,
I do not think we can love God without loving the Divine properties. To love
and delight in the Divine properties is to love God.
The value of worship may now be better appreciated. Worship of God does
not check creaturely narcissism because of fear that a bigger narcissist will be
jealous. Rather, in worship one's attention is drawn to the features which make
up the Divine Nature and constitute its excellence. It is a good thing for humans
to contemplate things of high, even supreme worth. The Divine perfections are
limitless and worthy of unending delight and pleasure. There is a beauty to the
holiness of God. Conceivably, the prevention of creatures contemplating and
adoring the divine properties may even harm them. God's self-love and our
worship is not so much a matter of some fellow being lucky enough to get the
Divine features while others did not-and we are stuck with delighting in his
features. Our devotion is to the Divine perfections themselves, co-instantiated
supremely in a person and so coinstantiated (or constituted) that no other being
could have them. Much Christian spiritual literature draws attention to a kind
of disinterested or self-forgetful character in the high adoration of God. W. H.
Auden once commented on the Narcissus myth that its lesson lies in Narcissus
delighting in the retlection being his, and not simply in the features themselves. 6
This may be further illustrated by a complementary case described by Thomas
Nagel. Nagel contends that his apprehension of the badness of pain, indeed a
pain he is feeling, does not rest essentially upon his apprehension that the pain
is his own.
"Of course he (a sufferer) wants to be rid of this pain reflectively-not
because he thinks it would be good to reduce the amount of pain in the
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world. But at the same time his awareness of how bad it is doesn't
essentially involve the thought that it is his. The desire to be rid of pain
has only the pain as its object. This is shown by the fact that it doesn't
even require the idea of oneself in order to make sense: if I lacked or
lost the conception of myself as distinct from other possible or actual
persons, I could still apprehend the badness of pain, immediately."7

In a similar vein we may imagine delighting in certain excellences without smug
self reference.
Can God be humble in His self-delight and summoning creatures to enjoy
Himself? God knows his great making features with clarity and precision; He
could not think of Himself as being just one of the gods, no better than the next
god. Return to a point made above about humility. Humility does not seem to
be characterized solely or even essentially by having self-degrading views of the
self. On the contrary, the entertainment of false beliefs about oneself is typically
associated with arrogance (see, for example, "The Parson's Talk," Canterbury
Tales). It would appear to be an instance of false humility for one to believe
worse of oneself in the face of evidence one has positive features, evidence
which would satisfy Clifford in his most epistemically compulsive moods. God's
self love may be understood to express proper pride, not vanity.
There is a dictum common to authorities in the Christian spiritual tradition
that we are to love God not for what He does for us, the rewards we might gain
from it, but to love God for His own sake. Indeed this is true, but as they also
note, the reward and fulfillment to be found from a non-reward conscious religious
life is great. There is a sense in which such God-love is akin to God's love of
Himself as traditionally conceived, for He does not love Himself for rewards
like money or enslaving servile creatures. We may not conclude from our discussion of worship that God is vain, for Divine self-love and creaturely love is
directed upon the divine excellences and perfection. Such may be in the domain
of proper pride, but not egotism and false pride.· Insofar as knowledge, power
and goodness are real goods and worthy objects of enjoyment, God's love of
these features is itself a good. We may understand Divine self love in a fanciful
way as goodness loving itself.
Consider a final objection. When I love God I am loving a person (or three
persons), not their properties of goodness per se and so on. I love and reverence
a person who discloses Himself to me in religious experience. Theistic essentialism is by no means universally accepted. Some hold that God can lose His
omnipotence and omniscience, albeit by His own choice. I can still love God
even if He should lose these supreme features. Therefore my love of God cannot
be accounted for as an intentional attitude directed upon divine properties per se.
Reply: Even if we reject the thesis of Divine simplicity and theistic essentialism,

149

THE VANITY OF GOD

it does not follow that worship is not best construed as a delight in the excellences
(properties) which do constitute God. One cannot love a bare particular, a thing
which has no properties whatever (one reason, I think, is that of metaphysical
necessity there cannot be such ontological items). The above critic is correct that
worship does not involve sheer disinterested delight in properties per se. First, I
believe worship of God involves reverencing the instantiation of these properties
in a person or person-like Being. We delight in there being a supremely wise, good
Creator and not simply in there being a Platonic property of Good, Wise Creatorhood. Second, we also adore the Divine lover revealed in our experience, the One
who lovingly interacts with us in specific ways. This still does not circumvent the
thesis that worship consists in reverent delight in supremely good or great making
properties. The Hound of Heaven we may encounter in religious experience comes
to us brimming over with delightful properties. 9
By way of a final, more fanciful, reply to our critic, consider a radically
nonessentialist theistic metaphysics. Imagine (per impossible?) God could lose
his great making properties. Yahweh could have been a human being born and
someone else, perhaps St. Augustine, could have been God. The roles may be
reversed. There is a saying attributed to St. Augustine which allows this to be
metaphysically possible. "0 my God, if I were God and thou Augustine, I would
wish that thou wert God and I Augustine." 10 We may consider the moral character
of worship in a Rawlsian framework." Let us introduce a veil of ignorance.
Consider both Yahweh and Augustine qua rational creatures neither knowing
which will tum out to be God. Would worship still be endorsed as appropriate
so that Augustine and Yahweh would be content to endorse it independent of
who will be the lucky one to wind up as God? Although this thought experiment
already seems to me well beyond what can be settled with ease, I believe worship
as I understand it would be so endorsed behind the veil. The delighting in
wisdom, creative power and knowledge seems to me a real good. This need in
no way involve endorsing an egoistic vanity. Presumably one would desire that
the person who winds up as God be given over to loving and delighting in the
creature. Yahweh is not vain; if He had Augustine's position and Augustine His
He would engage in divine worship without resentment. At the least, we have
no reason now to think He would not do so.
My own preference is to stick to Anselmian convictions about theistic essentialism. I merely offer the above, fanciful Rawlsian story to defend the propertyeyed view of worship against a nonAnselmian critic.
Does the Christian account of Salvation history suggest God is vain?
Redemption

The last charge of the objection from vanity I discuss concerns the Christian
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account of salvation or redemption. The centrality of Christ may suggest to the
critic a prima donna god who cannot bear to allow creatures to effect their own
salvation. There is a peculiarity in the Gospel accounts of Jesus' sayings. On
the one hand He is humble of heart and on the other He attributes to Himself a
title and centrality unequalled in human literature. Who has insisted with such
emphasis and force upon His centrality to the cosmos as the Christ of St. John's
gospel? Christian claims about Jesus range from cosmology to the deepest recesses
of our personality. In all such matters, Christ is to be in the limelight.
I believe the answer to this charge rests, in part, upon what I noted above
about creation and worship. If the motivation for creation need not involve
narcissistic vanity, neither need the motivation for the re-creation of life in
redemption.
There is not space here to outline in much detail the competing theories of
the atonement. The major theories insist that human creatures are unable to effect
a full atonement (at-one-ment, in Anglo-Saxon) with God, owing to willful
self-regard. The competing theories have different accounts of this inability. The
Anselmian theory is that humans cannot effect atonement because they cannot
satisfy Divine justice; the Abelardian theory is that humans are so self-centered
and bent upon cruelty that only a God-indwelt Christ could shock us out of moral
and spiritual bondage; the ransom theory is that humans have become captive
to Satan by their ill-doing and only Christ can overcome that powerful Demonic
Master. As with creation, God alone is in a position to effect the re-creation of
life, a restoration, or bringing about for the first time, a life of moral and spiritual
health. There is some debate in the Christian tradition as to what means God
was able to use in effecting redemption. Some means would seem to be unavailable (e.g., means which involve God's doing violence to innocent creatures,
and so on), but, on all the competing theories, there was a fittingness to God's
effecting it through incarnation. Does the atonement via incarnation itself suggest
vanity? The critic may charge that God cannot leave humanity alone, but egoism
prompts Him to take on human flesh as well.
The incarnation or enfleshment of God need not suggest egoism. There is as
little suggestion of vanity here as there is in cases of a human lover who longs
for and achieves unity with her beloved. But two Christian tenets make it harder
to make a case for improper Divine egoism: the teaching of human divinization,
and understanding the incarnation as a kind of Divine limiting.
The early Christian notion of divinization has received scant attention in AngloAmerican philosophy. In one of the Petrine epistles we read that we are to
become "partakers of the divine nature" (II Peter 1:4, RSV). In the fourth Gospel
it is said that we are to be one with Christ as Christ is one with the Father. It
is difficult to make sense of this within a theistic metaphysics, though William
Alston in a recent paper "The Indwelling of :he Holy Spirit," has advanced some
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intriguing suggestions of what may be involved epistemically, namely immediate
divine-human cognitive access. 12 However this is spelled out, from an ethical
standpoint the notion of divinization brings to light a problem with the vanity
objection. God does not seek to absorb other creatures, but to have them be so
linked with Him and He with them, that their action is harmonious and inextricably
bound together. Recall Jesus' dictum that whoever harms or benefits the most
vulnerable, hanns or benefits Himself (Matthew 25:40,41). The conjoinment of
wills and intent in a divine-human united life is to be one of creativity and rich
in value. The divine human identification is to be so tight as to rule out any
narrow self-interest or egoism. God's will is for the flourishing of all, in great,
ever increasing plenitude. If we are to imagine taking pleasure in oneself in such
a relationship it would be to take pleasure in God, and to take pleasure in God
would be to take pleasure in God's whole creation. As we are said to dwell in
God, God is said to dwell in us and share joy and sorrow. At the heart of most
plausible accounts of altruism and compassion there is emphasis upon one person
being affected and shaped by the well being of another. Your plight is of distress
to me; you delight in some of my joys. Such sharing and extension of personal
concern suggests a richly generous life. 13 Presumably the mutual regard in Divine
human life would be heightened considerably beyond the intimacy of any solely
human relationships. The psychology of egoism is not in evidence.
While the Christian understanding of the incarnation suggests to the critic a
vain God who cannot leave anyone alone, it can also suggest a startling image
of self-limiting love. In sin creatures are bereft of God and one another and, ex
hypothesi (given any of the plausible theories of the atonement), in need of
Divine action to effect a healing. The divine enfleshment may be understood as
a way to enhance the scope of human freedom and rich interplay with the
supernatural. This means of grace can be thought of as a marked self-limiting
of God. In a well known passage in Philippians we read that Christ did not count
equality with a God a thing to be grasped but humbled Himself to take on the
fonn of a servant.
There is not space to advance much of a Christology here. Suffice it to note
that any of the current, plausible Christian theories of the incarnation endeavor
to make some sense of the God-man living a life under considerably more limited
conditions than the unincarnate God prior to incarnation. 11 In Goods and Virtues
Michael Siote comments that humility seems to be of greater value, or to be
more wonderful, the more that it is embraced by persons of greater traits and
character. Thus:
But however we are ultimately to analyze humility, it follows from the
little we have already said that humility is (in the sense intended) a
dependent virtue. For intuitively it seems to attain its full status as a
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virtue or desirable trait of character only when accompanied by other
desirable traits. It is a positive virtue only in someone we have other
reasons to think well of. In addition, humility can seem more wonderful,
more admirable, the more highly we regard someone's other traits; ... '5

If this is correct, then surely the self limiting of Christ with respect to knowledge
and power, His coming to live as a human being in order to effect at-onement
with creatures and creator might well be an act of extraordinary humility. Indeed,
if we understand Divine omniscience as knowing all truths and yet claim the
second member of the trinity so limited his knowledge in the earthly life as to
embrace finite life, the Divine cognitive limiting might well be said to be infinite.
Surely the Divine limiting and the supremely redemptive willingness to be subject
to betrayal, hatred and physical suffering may be understood as God embracing
a humbled role. The God who comes to us as a servant does not strike one
naturally as the god of Narcissus.
In concluding, I concede that for all I have suggested in reply to my imagined
critic, at best I have shown that the vanity objection lacks clear force. There are
ways to meet the objection. We may succeed in reading the notions of incarnation
and divinization in salvation history as involving a real humbling of Godhead.
Divine creation and worship are instances of proper pride, not vanity. Moreover,
we may appeal to tenets in Christianity which appear to portray God as not in
any way having defects which prompt you and me to vain pride, viz. low
self-image, a need to show off and so on. The critic may still persist, and her
persistence may stem from a sound, penetrating psychoanalysis of evil. Evil has
many faces. But the critic's persistence may also stem from lack of appreciating
the subtleties of the good. 16
St. Olaf College

NOTES
I. Clifford insisted we not accept beliefs without sufficient, overriding evidence. James had a more
lax view, claiming that one is within one's epistemic rights to accept beliefs of a certain kind under
conditions when Cliffordian standards are not met. The reader is referred to The Ethics of Belief
Debate edited by Gerald McCarthy (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986) for a deeper account of the
Clifford·James controversy. Issues of epistemic justification are not irrelevant to settling disputes
about when emotions like pride, jealousy and envy are appropriate. Insofar as pride involves beliefs
about oneself, the warrant for such pride rests in part upon the epistemic warrant of the beliefs. As
an aside note, I believe some of Alvin Plantinga's recent work on the positive epistemic status of
beliefs can shed light on a theistic account of appropriate justified emotions.
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2. See David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 2, part I. For a recent illuminating
discussion of this relation see Pride, Shame and Guilt by Gabriele Taylor (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985).
3. See, for example, Brian Davies, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1982). Consider also J. A. Picton's dictum: "True religious worship doth not
consist in the acknowledgement of a greatness which is estimated by comparison, but rather in the
sense of a Being who surpasses all comparison ... Hence the deepest religious feeling necessarily
shrinks from thinking of God as a kind of gigantic Self amidst a host of minor selves. The very
thought of such a thing is a mockery of the profoundest devotion" (cited by W. R. Inge, Christian
Mysticism (New York: Meridian, 1960), p. 32). One way to avoid thinking of God as a gigantic
Self is to think of Him as a small Self. Another is to think of Him as a Self of no size at all. In the
text here I simply note I do not try to avoid the objection from vanity on the grounds that God is
not a self at all, whatever the size. I have some doubts as to whether Davies can identify God with
Being and still remain a theist. Note that Paul Tillich identifies God with Being and does not consider
his resultant metaphysics to be theistic.
4. Richard Creel, Divine Impassibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). See also
Taliaferro, "The Impassibility of God," Religious Studies, forthcoming.
5. Cf. Norman Kretzmann, "Goodness, Knowledge, and Indeterminacy in the Philosophy of Thomas
Aquinas," Journal of Philosophy, October 1983.
6. W. H. Auden cited by Henry Fairlie, The Seven Deadly Sins Today (Notre Dame: University
of Notre Dame, 1979), p. 53.
7. Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 161.
To use Nagel's terminology, I believe there are agent-relative as well as agent-neutral reasons for
Divine worship. The worth of such worship is appreciable from an impersonal standpoint or the
view from nowhere in particular.
8. Immanuel Kant claimed that humility and true, noble pride are two features of proper self-respect.
See his Lectures on Ethics, "Proper Self-Respect" and "Duties to Oneself," translated by Louis
Enfield (New York: Harper and Row, 1963).
9. Of course there are many metaphysical theories about the relationship of properties and things,
the qualified particular theory of Douglas Long, the bundled property theory of Bertrand Russell,
and the property and bare particular theory of Edwin Allaire. For present purposes I am assuming
that whichever metaphysics is adopted, worship is oriented towards certain excellent properties.
10. St. Augustine as cited by E. L. Mascal in He Who Is (New York: Longmans, Green and Co.,
1948), p. 196.
11. Cf. A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).
12. Philosophy and the Christian Faith, edited by T. V. Morris (Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1987).

13. I seek to develop a religious understanding of this sharing in "The Co-inherence," Christian
Scholar's Review, forthcoming. For a recent elucidation of unselfish concern for others, see Unselfishness by Nicholas Rescher (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1975), especially 'The Vicarious
Affects and the Modalities of Unselfishness. "Current work on altruistic compassion can also illumine
the Christian understanding of the spiritual life. See Thomas Nagel's The Possibility of Altruism
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978) and Lawrence Blum's Friendship, Altruism and Morality
(Boston: Routledge and K. Paul, 1980). Egoism and Altruism, edited by R. D. Milo (Belmont:
Wadsworth, 1973) is a helpful anthology drawing together important classic work on the topic.
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14. Even Christologies which repudiate kenoticism in its 20th century form, leave room for understanding the incarnation as a real limiting of power by the second person of the trinity. See Thomas
Morris, The Logic of God Incarnate (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1986). SflJren Kierkegaard
beautifully portrays the incarnation as a Divine limiting and humbling, a humbling that does not
overshadow or compromise the integrity and freedom of the creature. The incarnation may even be
viewed along Kierkegaardian lines as part of God's enlarging and enhancing human selfhood. See
especially "From on High He will draw all men unto Himself," Part III, Training in Christianity,
translated and edited by Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).
IS. Michael Slote, Goods and Virtues (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), p. 62.
16. This paper is dedicated to my brother, Robin Taliaferro, who first pressed home to me the force
of the objection from vanity. I am indebted to Michael Beatty, Stephen Evans, William Alston, Ed
Langerak, Linda Zagzebski, and an anonymous referee for Faith and Philosophy for helpful comments
on an earlier draft.

